[Secure Boot KEK Update] ASUS PK-Signed KEK Update#295
[Secure Boot KEK Update] ASUS PK-Signed KEK Update#295Flickdm merged 1 commit intomicrosoft:mainfrom
Conversation
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@Flickdm is this one correct? Firstly, For the working [other] KEK I get: ...and this one I get: i.e. it's two KEKs signed by a test key. I mean if that works then I guess it's fine, it's just the first one I've seen with two certs. It's certainly odd. |
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@ChengAn0519 do you have any ideas on why this is different? Thanks. |
Appears that the "payload" that was used was comprised of the 2011 and 2023 KEK as two different EFI_SIGNATURE_LISTs concatenated together to make a EFI_SIGNATURE_DATABASE that can be signed. The logic in question I've discussed in #281 :
if (CompareMem (NewCert, Cert, CertList->SignatureSize) == 0) {
typedef struct _EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA {
EFI_GUID SignatureOwner;
UINT8 SignatureData [_];
} EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA;
This payload if used as built will work to update a system to 2023 KEK. However (and I can't speak for Linux) Windows will assume that all signed payloads use the same payload when attempting to apply. Two CAs will cause that signature validation to fail. So as built there is an incongruency between our servicing logic and this payload. |
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@hughsie |
All good information! Thank you for the update! |
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Okay, thanks. Uploaded as https://fwupd.org/lvfs/firmware/126771/ with this fix to the auto-uploader: https://gitlab.com/fwupd/lvfs-website/-/commit/5a303b656bb0181c0dd7b9e977aaf918ccaf8c12 |
OEM Certificate Submission
OEM Name: ASUS
Contact Email: ChengAn_Chiu@asus.com
Certificate Details
Testing Completed
Security Review
Additional Notes
Platform Key Thumbprint SHA1: B3840DFCF8AB23704E6C5E51CE6F3E38459EF9AC