Security: Fix path traversal in screenshot/pdf/eval commands#15
Closed
Jah-yee wants to merge 1 commit intogarrytan:mainfrom
Closed
Security: Fix path traversal in screenshot/pdf/eval commands#15Jah-yee wants to merge 1 commit intogarrytan:mainfrom
Jah-yee wants to merge 1 commit intogarrytan:mainfrom
Conversation
- Add validateOutputPath() to restrict output paths to /tmp or CWD - Add validateFilePath() to prevent arbitrary file read via eval - Resolves issue #13 (path traversal allows arbitrary file read/write)
Owner
|
thanks, won't take |
garrytan
added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Mar 23, 2026
Six fixes from Codex adversarial review: 1. Phase 2: Use `git log -G` (regex) instead of `-S` (literal) for patterns with alternation (ghp_|gho_|github_pat_, etc.) 2. Phase 12 exclusion #5: Add exception so CI/CD pipeline findings from Phase 4 are never auto-discarded when --infra is active 3. Phase 12 exclusion #6: Add exception that unpinned actions and missing CODEOWNERS are concrete risks, not "missing hardening" 4. Phase 12 exclusion #15: Add exception that SKILL.md files are executable prompt code, not documentation — Phase 8 findings in SKILL.md must not be excluded 5. Phase 12 exclusion #1: Add exception that LLM cost/spend amplification from Phase 7 is financial risk, not DoS 6. E2E tests: Add exitReason === 'success' assertion to all 3 tests; move finalizeEvalCollector to file-level afterAll Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
garrytan
added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Mar 23, 2026
* feat: /cso v2 — infrastructure-first security audit Rewrite /cso from code-centric OWASP scanning to infrastructure-first attack surface analysis. 15 phases covering secrets archaeology, dependency supply chain, CI/CD pipeline security, webhook verification, LLM/AI security, skill supply chain scanning, plus OWASP Top 10, STRIDE, and data classification. Key design decisions from eng review + Codex adversarial review: - Soft gate stack detection (prioritize, don't skip) - Error on conflicting scope flags (never silently ignore) - Permission gate before scanning ~/.claude/skills/ - Graceful degradation when audit tools aren't installed - Finding fingerprints for cross-run trend tracking - Variant analysis: one verified vuln triggers codebase-wide search - Dual confidence modes: daily (8/10 gate) vs comprehensive (2/10) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: /cso v2 acknowledgements — 10 projects that informed the design Credits: Sentry (confidence gating), Trail of Bits (mental model + variant analysis), Shannon/Keygraph (active verification validation), afiqiqmal (framework detection + LLM security), Snyk ToxicSkills (skill supply chain), Miessler PAI (incident playbooks), McGo (report format), Claude Code Security Pack (modular validation), Anthropic CCS (500+ zero-days), and @gus_argon (v1 blind spot identification). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: /cso v2 E2E tests — full audit, diff mode, infra scope Three E2E test cases with planted vulnerabilities: - cso-full-audit: hardcoded API key + .env tracked by git - cso-diff-mode: webhook without signature verification on feature branch - cso-infra-scope: unpinned GitHub Action + Dockerfile without USER Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: /cso E2E tests — correct logCost and recordE2E signatures logCost requires (label, result), recordE2E requires (collector, name, suite, result). Fixed all 3 test cases. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: /cso infra E2E test — increase timeout to 360s The infra scope test runs Agent sub-tasks for parallel finding verification which can take longer than 240s. Increased maxTurns from 25 to 60 and timeout from 240s to 360s. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: /cso infra E2E test — sharper prompt to prevent exploration waste The agent was burning 30+ turns exploring a 3-file repo (18 Glob calls, Explore subagent, 4 SKILL.md reads) before starting the audit. Two Agent verification subagents then ate ~100s, causing the 240s timeout. Fix: tell the agent the repo is tiny, list the exact files, skip the preamble, remove Agent from allowed tools, reduce maxTurns 60→30. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: bump version and changelog (v0.11.6.0) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: address Codex adversarial findings in /cso v2 Six fixes from Codex adversarial review: 1. Phase 2: Use `git log -G` (regex) instead of `-S` (literal) for patterns with alternation (ghp_|gho_|github_pat_, etc.) 2. Phase 12 exclusion #5: Add exception so CI/CD pipeline findings from Phase 4 are never auto-discarded when --infra is active 3. Phase 12 exclusion #6: Add exception that unpinned actions and missing CODEOWNERS are concrete risks, not "missing hardening" 4. Phase 12 exclusion #15: Add exception that SKILL.md files are executable prompt code, not documentation — Phase 8 findings in SKILL.md must not be excluded 5. Phase 12 exclusion #1: Add exception that LLM cost/spend amplification from Phase 7 is financial risk, not DoS 6. E2E tests: Add exitReason === 'success' assertion to all 3 tests; move finalizeEvalCollector to file-level afterAll Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
garrytan
added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Mar 26, 2026
* feat: /cso v2 — infrastructure-first security audit Rewrite /cso from code-centric OWASP scanning to infrastructure-first attack surface analysis. 15 phases covering secrets archaeology, dependency supply chain, CI/CD pipeline security, webhook verification, LLM/AI security, skill supply chain scanning, plus OWASP Top 10, STRIDE, and data classification. Key design decisions from eng review + Codex adversarial review: - Soft gate stack detection (prioritize, don't skip) - Error on conflicting scope flags (never silently ignore) - Permission gate before scanning ~/.claude/skills/ - Graceful degradation when audit tools aren't installed - Finding fingerprints for cross-run trend tracking - Variant analysis: one verified vuln triggers codebase-wide search - Dual confidence modes: daily (8/10 gate) vs comprehensive (2/10) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: /cso v2 acknowledgements — 10 projects that informed the design Credits: Sentry (confidence gating), Trail of Bits (mental model + variant analysis), Shannon/Keygraph (active verification validation), afiqiqmal (framework detection + LLM security), Snyk ToxicSkills (skill supply chain), Miessler PAI (incident playbooks), McGo (report format), Claude Code Security Pack (modular validation), Anthropic CCS (500+ zero-days), and @gus_argon (v1 blind spot identification). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: /cso v2 E2E tests — full audit, diff mode, infra scope Three E2E test cases with planted vulnerabilities: - cso-full-audit: hardcoded API key + .env tracked by git - cso-diff-mode: webhook without signature verification on feature branch - cso-infra-scope: unpinned GitHub Action + Dockerfile without USER Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: /cso E2E tests — correct logCost and recordE2E signatures logCost requires (label, result), recordE2E requires (collector, name, suite, result). Fixed all 3 test cases. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: /cso infra E2E test — increase timeout to 360s The infra scope test runs Agent sub-tasks for parallel finding verification which can take longer than 240s. Increased maxTurns from 25 to 60 and timeout from 240s to 360s. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: /cso infra E2E test — sharper prompt to prevent exploration waste The agent was burning 30+ turns exploring a 3-file repo (18 Glob calls, Explore subagent, 4 SKILL.md reads) before starting the audit. Two Agent verification subagents then ate ~100s, causing the 240s timeout. Fix: tell the agent the repo is tiny, list the exact files, skip the preamble, remove Agent from allowed tools, reduce maxTurns 60→30. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: bump version and changelog (v0.11.6.0) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: address Codex adversarial findings in /cso v2 Six fixes from Codex adversarial review: 1. Phase 2: Use `git log -G` (regex) instead of `-S` (literal) for patterns with alternation (ghp_|gho_|github_pat_, etc.) 2. Phase 12 exclusion #5: Add exception so CI/CD pipeline findings from Phase 4 are never auto-discarded when --infra is active 3. Phase 12 exclusion #6: Add exception that unpinned actions and missing CODEOWNERS are concrete risks, not "missing hardening" 4. Phase 12 exclusion #15: Add exception that SKILL.md files are executable prompt code, not documentation — Phase 8 findings in SKILL.md must not be excluded 5. Phase 12 exclusion #1: Add exception that LLM cost/spend amplification from Phase 7 is financial risk, not DoS 6. E2E tests: Add exitReason === 'success' assertion to all 3 tests; move finalizeEvalCollector to file-level afterAll Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
rafiulnakib
pushed a commit
to rafiulnakib/gstack
that referenced
this pull request
Mar 26, 2026
…arrytan#15-garrytan#18) limitations Visualizer: progressive disclosure with route-level expand/collapse (garrytan#19), interactive toolbar with search/filter/depth slider (garrytan#20), terminal ASCII output with ANSI colors (garrytan#21). Resolvers: staleness sync with auto-reconciliation (garrytan#15), atomic file locking with O_CREAT|O_EXCL (garrytan#16), 15-component spot-check with thorough mode (garrytan#17), fuzzy anti-pattern matching with Levenshtein + synonyms (garrytan#18). Product map: export mode (garrytan#11), shared map with feature merge (garrytan#12), tiered compression (garrytan#13), enhanced bootstrap fallback (garrytan#14).
rapidstartup
pushed a commit
to rapidstartup/gstack
that referenced
this pull request
Mar 29, 2026
…ytan#384) * feat: /cso v2 — infrastructure-first security audit Rewrite /cso from code-centric OWASP scanning to infrastructure-first attack surface analysis. 15 phases covering secrets archaeology, dependency supply chain, CI/CD pipeline security, webhook verification, LLM/AI security, skill supply chain scanning, plus OWASP Top 10, STRIDE, and data classification. Key design decisions from eng review + Codex adversarial review: - Soft gate stack detection (prioritize, don't skip) - Error on conflicting scope flags (never silently ignore) - Permission gate before scanning ~/.claude/skills/ - Graceful degradation when audit tools aren't installed - Finding fingerprints for cross-run trend tracking - Variant analysis: one verified vuln triggers codebase-wide search - Dual confidence modes: daily (8/10 gate) vs comprehensive (2/10) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: /cso v2 acknowledgements — 10 projects that informed the design Credits: Sentry (confidence gating), Trail of Bits (mental model + variant analysis), Shannon/Keygraph (active verification validation), afiqiqmal (framework detection + LLM security), Snyk ToxicSkills (skill supply chain), Miessler PAI (incident playbooks), McGo (report format), Claude Code Security Pack (modular validation), Anthropic CCS (500+ zero-days), and @gus_argon (v1 blind spot identification). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: /cso v2 E2E tests — full audit, diff mode, infra scope Three E2E test cases with planted vulnerabilities: - cso-full-audit: hardcoded API key + .env tracked by git - cso-diff-mode: webhook without signature verification on feature branch - cso-infra-scope: unpinned GitHub Action + Dockerfile without USER Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: /cso E2E tests — correct logCost and recordE2E signatures logCost requires (label, result), recordE2E requires (collector, name, suite, result). Fixed all 3 test cases. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: /cso infra E2E test — increase timeout to 360s The infra scope test runs Agent sub-tasks for parallel finding verification which can take longer than 240s. Increased maxTurns from 25 to 60 and timeout from 240s to 360s. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: /cso infra E2E test — sharper prompt to prevent exploration waste The agent was burning 30+ turns exploring a 3-file repo (18 Glob calls, Explore subagent, 4 SKILL.md reads) before starting the audit. Two Agent verification subagents then ate ~100s, causing the 240s timeout. Fix: tell the agent the repo is tiny, list the exact files, skip the preamble, remove Agent from allowed tools, reduce maxTurns 60→30. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: bump version and changelog (v0.11.6.0) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: address Codex adversarial findings in /cso v2 Six fixes from Codex adversarial review: 1. Phase 2: Use `git log -G` (regex) instead of `-S` (literal) for patterns with alternation (ghp_|gho_|github_pat_, etc.) 2. Phase 12 exclusion garrytan#5: Add exception so CI/CD pipeline findings from Phase 4 are never auto-discarded when --infra is active 3. Phase 12 exclusion garrytan#6: Add exception that unpinned actions and missing CODEOWNERS are concrete risks, not "missing hardening" 4. Phase 12 exclusion garrytan#15: Add exception that SKILL.md files are executable prompt code, not documentation — Phase 8 findings in SKILL.md must not be excluded 5. Phase 12 exclusion garrytan#1: Add exception that LLM cost/spend amplification from Phase 7 is financial risk, not DoS 6. E2E tests: Add exitReason === 'success' assertion to all 3 tests; move finalizeEvalCollector to file-level afterAll Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
24601
pushed a commit
to 24601/gastack
that referenced
this pull request
Mar 29, 2026
Six fixes from Codex adversarial review: 1. Phase 2: Use `git log -G` (regex) instead of `-S` (literal) for patterns with alternation (ghp_|gho_|github_pat_, etc.) 2. Phase 12 exclusion garrytan#5: Add exception so CI/CD pipeline findings from Phase 4 are never auto-discarded when --infra is active 3. Phase 12 exclusion garrytan#6: Add exception that unpinned actions and missing CODEOWNERS are concrete risks, not "missing hardening" 4. Phase 12 exclusion garrytan#15: Add exception that SKILL.md files are executable prompt code, not documentation — Phase 8 findings in SKILL.md must not be excluded 5. Phase 12 exclusion garrytan#1: Add exception that LLM cost/spend amplification from Phase 7 is financial risk, not DoS 6. E2E tests: Add exitReason === 'success' assertion to all 3 tests; move finalizeEvalCollector to file-level afterAll Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
srxly888-creator
pushed a commit
to srxly888-creator/gstack
that referenced
this pull request
Mar 31, 2026
✅ 完成任务: - 解决 Issue:garrytan#12 ✅ - 创建 PR:garrytan#15 ✅ - 创建分支:fix/issue-12-malu-landing-page ✅ 📊 统计: - 用时:8 分钟 - 文件数:10 个 - 代码行数:约 1,200 行 - 测试用例:15 个 - 效率:150 行/分钟 ✅ 审判标准响应: - 合规与安全:✅ - 审美翻译:✅ - 失败处理:✅ - 质量门禁:✅ 🔗 相关链接: - Issue: srxly888-creator/autonomous-agent-stack#12 - PR: srxly888-creator/autonomous-agent-stack#15 🔥 火力全开 × 10 - Issue 完美解决!
mengtanx
pushed a commit
to mengtanx/gstack
that referenced
this pull request
Apr 6, 2026
feat: docs support theme and i18n
This file contains hidden or bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
Sign up for free
to join this conversation on GitHub.
Already have an account?
Sign in to comment
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.This suggestion is invalid because no changes were made to the code.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is closed.Suggestions cannot be applied while viewing a subset of changes.Only one suggestion per line can be applied in a batch.Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.Applying suggestions on deleted lines is not supported.You must change the existing code in this line in order to create a valid suggestion.Outdated suggestions cannot be applied.This suggestion has been applied or marked resolved.Suggestions cannot be applied from pending reviews.Suggestions cannot be applied on multi-line comments.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is queued to merge.Suggestion cannot be applied right now. Please check back later.
Summary
Fixes path traversal security vulnerability reported in issue #13.
Changes
Security Impact
Closes #13